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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MATi 01; HI AH 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
DUKE G. DUCCINI, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 940523-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE Ul i m PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-404(1990), inthe Second Judicial District Cum t Wi-bci« ouni\, (in: I iuuorable 
Michael J. Glasmann presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) 
(Supp. 1994). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Question: Can this Court review a pretrial suppression ruling where the only evidence adduced 
in the suppression lica II NJ.1 .i tianscnpl nt ddntdaiil s police interview is noi pail of the record 
on appeal? 
Standard of review1 VVIiur \m appellani t/nk lo pm\n|i' m M.lci|iiate record un appeal, 
the reviewing court presumes the regularity of proceedings below. Call v. City of West Jordan. 
788 P.2d 1049, 1053, cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Linden. 761 P 2d 
13K6, 1188 (Huh rW8,i <prr curiam) (jury voir dire recorded but not transcribed). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Applicable provisions are reproduced in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information dated 1 December 1993 with theft of property exceeding 
$1,000 in value, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 
1). Defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity (R. 32-33). At a competency hearing on 
26 January 1994, the district court found that defendant was not competent to stand trial at that 
time and committed him to the Utah State Hospital (R. 44). 
Some two months later the Utah State Hospital Clinical Director certified that defendant 
was competent to stand trial (R. 46) and the district court ordered his release to the county sheriff 
(R. 45). The district court remanded the case to the circuit court for a preliminary hearing, and 
defendant was bound over (R. 28, 50). He entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity 
(R. 56-57). 
Defendant moved to suppress his confession (R. 66-67,71-95). After a suppression hearing, 
the court denied this motion (R. 120, 129, 463). On 28 June 1994, after a two-day trial, a jury 
found defendant guilty and mentally ill (R. 130). He was sentenced to the statutory prison term 
(R. 132). He timely appealed (R. 135). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On 26 November 1993, defendant stole a 16-foot flatbed trailer valued in excess of $1500, 
together with some scaffolding, from a South Ogden construction site. The owner was Rickie 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, record facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
2 
Wright, a brick contractor (R. 164-70). Defendant transported Wright's trailer to the home of 
his friend Charles Brown (R. 221, 224). He represented to Brown that the trailer was not stolen 
and asked Bmv n lo pa ml ii lm him. which Brown did (R. 172, 221-22, 244). 
Several days later Detective Roger Hunt apprehended defendant at the Orleans Motel (R. 
228). Hunt informed defendant of ins Miranda rights, VUIRII he wmwd ill*1 ?.M)\ l iu l ;ii (he 
police station, Hunt questioned defendant on tape for over half an hour (R. 232-33). Defendant 
gave various conflicting explanations for the trailer's disappearance, although lie did not deny 
removing it from the construction site (R. 233-37,243). In the interview, defendant never claimed 
that someone paid him $50 to move the trailer (R. 234), a theory he advanced at trial through 
hi* wife (R. 295). 
In January 1994, Rhett Potter, a licensed social worker, examined defendant and opined 
attention deficit disorder; and that his intelligence was limited (R. 87). Also, Harvey Wheelwright, 
a psychiatrist, opined that defendant had a mental illness of a complicated nature; thai his basic 
problem was severe attention deficit disorder and severe dyslexia; and that he had developed a 
"schizophrenic disorder of the paranoid type," including auditory hallucinations i n 
In March 1994, Peter Heinbecker, a psychiatrist and lawyer at the Utah State Hospital, reported 
that defendant had been placed on medications and opined that he was competent to stand trial 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to police. After 
reviewing a transcription of the police interrogation, the district court held a hearing at which 
it received arguments of counsel, but no additional evidence. Based on the contents of the transcript 
and on Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the district court refused to suppress. Defendant 
attacks this ruling. However, he has not made the transcribed police interview a part of the record 
on appeal. This Court must therefore presume the regularity of the proceedings below, arid affirm. 
Defendant's claim has no merit in any event. Although he has established some degree of 
mental illness, he has failed to demonstrate that the police interrogation was coercive. Since the 
voluntariness of a confession under the Due Process Clause "has always depended on the absence 
of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word," id. at 170, defendant 
has not demonstrated that his incriminating statements were given involuntarily here. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO INCLUDE IN THE RECORD THE 
TRANSCRIPT OF HIS INTERROGATION, THIS COURT MUST PRESUME 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SUPPRESS IT 
Defendant challenges the district court's refusal to suppress incriminating statements 
made during police interrogation. Br. of Appellant at 7. His brief, which cites neither the 
United States nor the Utah constitution, is unclear about the precise legal grounds for his 
challenge. However, he cites Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157 (1986) and State v. 
Singer. 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991), Br. of Appellant at 7, 10, both of which rest 
solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 479 U.S. at 163; 815 
4 
P.2d at 1309. The State therefore proceeds on the assumption that defendant claims no other 
legal grounds for his challenge. This ground was preserved below (R. 463 at 8-9).2 
A. In the absence of crucial evidence, this Court must presume the district 
court acted properly. 
Because the record on appeal does not contain the interview transcript upon which the 
district court's ruling was based, this Court must affirm. 
Defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements made in the course of a police 
interview, which had been tape-recorded and transcribed (see R. 112). The transcription 
apparently ran to over 30 pages (R. 463 at 12). Counsel argued based on this transcription 
(id. at 3, 7). No live testimony was introduced at the suppression hearing, nor were any 
exhibits admitted (id. at 2). It is apparent from the transcript of the suppression hearing that 
the court was familiar with the transcribed interview (id. at 6, 17). Indeed, the trial judge 
expressly relied on it in finding that the police interrogation was not coercive, finding that 
defendant's statements were given voluntarily, and thus denying defendant's motion to 
suppress (id. at 17-18). 
However, defendant never moved to admit the transcript below and it does not appear 
in the record on appeal. Without this transcription, this Court cannot review the district 
court's conclusion that police questioning was not coercive. Consequently, it must affirm. 
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires the appellant to include in 
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to any finding or conclusion appellant claims 
2
 However, Brief of Appellant does not comply with rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
5 
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence. "In essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to 
provide this Court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal." Sampson v. 
Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 116 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Where 
an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court presumes the 
regularity of proceedings below. Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 
(Utah 1988) (per curiam) (Jury vou" dire recorded but not transcribed). 
The burden to ensure that the record contains the materials necessary to support an 
appeal rests with the appellant. State v. Linden. 761 P.2d at 1388; State v. Theison. 709 
P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985). An appellate court will not "speculate on the existence of facts 
that do not appear in the record." Id. "When crucial matters are not included in the record, 
the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court." JjL See also 
Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033 (1990); 
State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 
1985); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983); State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263, 
1267 (Utah 1982). "Absent that recordf.J defendant's assignment of error stands as a 
unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine. This Court simply 
cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by 
the record." State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Barella. 714 
P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986) (in turn quoting State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 
1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983))). Moreover, "[n]either the court nor the appellee 
6 
is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the 
transcript." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
The trial transcript is before this Court. And, at trial the interviewing officer did quote, 
summarize, and describe parts of the transcribed interview {see generally R. 232-53). He 
also testified as to defendant's "body language" and "demeanor" (R. 253). Therefore, the 
evidence presented at trial was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive of the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing in the form of the transcribed interview. 
Nor did defendant renew his motion to suppress at trial. Had he done so, it would be 
proper for this Court to review the trial transcript. Instead, defendant asks this Court to 
review the suppression ruling on the basis of the bits and pieces of the transcription that the 
parties happened to introduce through witnesses at trial. There is no guarantee that the 
portions of the transcript the district judge considered decisive were ever introduced at trial. 
Although Utah has no rule, most appellate courts, in reviewing the denial of a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence, will consider only evidence before the court at the suppression 
hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks. 978 F.2d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baez v. 
State. 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 1992); State v. Rvder. 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 
(Iowa 1982); Aiken v. State. 647 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651 A.2d 
854 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Powers. 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979); 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(c) (1987).3 
3
 However, renewal of a pretrial motion at trial may expand the scope of appellate review 
to evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., State v. Derr. 451 S.E.2d 731, 740 n.6 (W.V. 1994); 
4 LaFave; supra. See also United States v. Martin. 982 F.2d 1236, 1241 (8th Cir. 1993) (trial 
(continued...) 
7 
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a 
pretrial ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of 
affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz. 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin. 982 F.2d 1236, 
1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basev. 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); 
State v. Young. 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Duncan. 879 
S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong. 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Hawaii 
Ct. App. 1994) (reversal). 
The principle unifying these cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but will not 
reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the district court at the time it ruled. 
However, the State is aware of no jurisdiction following the rule defendant tacitly urges, that 
an appellate court may reverse a pretrial ruling based only oh evidence presented at trial 
without considering evidence presented at the pretrial hearing. 
Because defendant did not renew his motion to suppress at trial, this Court should not 
consider trial testimony in reviewing the court's pretrial order. However, even if this Court 
were inclined to include trial testimony within its review, it would still be improper to rely 
solely on trial testimony in testing a ruling that was made solely on the basis of a 
transcription of defendant's interview. 
3(...continued) 
objection necessary to preserve issue of discrepancy between witness's testimony at trial and at 
suppression hearing); Writtv. State. 541S. W.2d 424,426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (if no evidence 
was submitted on the pretrial motion, renewal of motion at trial is necessary to preserve issue 
on appeal); Wells v. Commonwealth. 371 S.E.2d 19, 22 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (where motion 
to suppress was renewed at close of trial, appellate court may consider entire record). 
8 
Consequently, in the absence of crucial portions of the record, this Court should 
presume the correctness of the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
B. Available evidence supports the district court's ruling in any event. 
To review the district court's ruling based solely upon the trial transcript would be 
futile and unjust. But even such a review would confirm that the trial judge's ruling was 
correct. 
Based upon its review of the transcribed interview, and citing Colorado v. Connelly, 
479 U.S. 157 (1986), the district court found that the police interrogation was not coercive 
and, accordingly, refused to suppress defendant's incriminating statement notwithstanding his 
mental problems (R. 463 at 18). 
Colorado v. Connelly clearly controls. That case involved a defendant who was 
"suffering from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state" the day before he 
confessed. 479 U.S. at 161. A psychiatrist employed by the state hospital testified that the 
defendant's "command hallucinations" interfered with his "volitional abilities" and that his 
"psychosis motivate his confession." Id. at 161-62. The Colorado Supreme Court, holding 
that "the proper test for admissibility is whether the statements are 'the product of a rational 
intellect and a free will,'" id. at 162, affirmed suppression. 
However, the United States Supreme Court observed that "[t]he purpose of excluding 
evidence seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of 
the Constitution." Id. at 166. Accordingly, it held that "coercive police activity is a 
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 167. "The voluntariness of a 
9 
waiver of this [Fifth Amendment] privilege," the Court continued, "has always depended on 
the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word." 
Id. at 170.4 
This Court followed Connelly in State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991). 
Singer claimed that his interrogation was not "inherently coercive," but that "federal agents 
used a subtle form of coercion, to which he was particularly vulnerable" due to his "peculiar 
personal characteristics," including clinical depression, lack of socialization, and extreme 
gullibility. Id. at 1309-10. This Court rejected his argument, stating, "The United States 
Supreme Court in Colorado v. Connelly, eschewed a 'free will' analysis of voluntariness of 
confessions. The Court stated that the sole concern underlying the Fifth Amendment is 
coercive tactics by government agents." Id. at 1310 (citation omitted). 
The heart of defendant's claim is that, while the officer's interrogation was not 
inherently coercive, it had the effect of extracting incriminating statements from defendant 
because of his mental condition. At the motion to suppress, counsel argued that while the 
interviewing officer's technique "may not be flat out threats or flat out coercion in the sense 
that he is telling him that he is going to charge him with something more serious, or 
anything like that. But based upon Mr. Duccini's mental condition at the time, I think that 
could very easily be construed . . . to be coercive" (R. 463 at 8). This is precisely the 
4
 However, "the fact that the police interview was coercive [is] not enough, by itself, to render 
the defendant's confession involuntary. To be involuntary, there must be a causal relationship 
between the coercion and the subsequent confession." State v. Mabe. 864 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 
1993). 
10 
argument rejected by the United States Supreme Court and this Court in Connelly and 
Singer, respectively. 
Nor has defendant demonstrated "coercive tactics by government agents." His brief 
claims that the interview was coercive because "Detective Hunt changed his form of 
questioning to stating facts, and asking the Defendant if each fact was not true." Br. of 
Appellant at 8-9. Yet the only passage in the record cited for this assertion does not support 
it (see R. 266-67). Moreover, defendant cites no authority to the effect that an interrogation 
that employs leading questions is coercive, and the State knows of none. Cf. People v. Cox. 
270 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("The fact that the questions were somewhat 
leading does not equate to a conclusion that they were coercive."). 
Defendant also claims, "If Detective Hunt did not receive the affirmation to the question 
that he desired he would try to argue with the Defendant with a view of causing him to 
affirm the question he was asking." Br. of Appellant at 8-9. Again, defendant cites only a 
single page for what he implies was a repeated questioning technique, and even that one page 
does not support his claim (see R. 250). 
Finally, the interrogating officer had no reason to believe that defendant was incapable 
of speaking lucidly and voluntarily. Although at one point defendant stated he was on ritalin 
(R. 245), the officer testified that he showed no external signs of mental illness, "seemed 
fine," and "had no problems with the questions I was asking him" (R. 241, 268, 275). It 
never occurred to the officer that defendant "was having a problem with competence . . . as 
far as his ability to talk . . . on a voluntary basis" (R. 268-69). There was no coercion here. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs, oral 
argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted ort3, /February 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
stant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed by first 
class mail this^j, I February 1995 to: 
TONY B. MILES 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
12 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). Theft. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen property. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; . . . 
ADDENDUM B 
Rule 11(e). The record on appeal. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to 
appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding 
or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct 
appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
ADDENDUM C 
GARY R. HEWARD, UBN 5085 
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE 
7TH FLOOR MUNICIPAL BUILDING 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: 399-8377 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS AND ORDER 
JUN2 9 1994 
DUKE G. DUCCINI, : Criminal No. 931900^64 
Defendant. : Judge Michael J. Glasmann 
The Court having reviewed the Memorandums submitted by counsel for defendant and the State 
of Utah, and after hearing the arguments presented by both sides this date, hereby finds and rules as 
follows: 
The State of Utah has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement taken from 
defendant on November 29, 1993 by Detective Roger Hunt, South Ogden Police Department, was 
voluntarily given by defendant. 
THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SAID STATEMENT IS 
DENIED. 
DATED this 17th day of June, 1994. 
. . . . : . ,-..';. I I 
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